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Abstract
Many critics of Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy see the novel’s narrative elements and structure as a form of
narrative play, which reject Enlightenment systems of understanding. In this paper, through the philosophy of
Friedrich Schiller, I will argue that the novel’s narrative structure is best understood as a balance of aesthetic
impulses. For most scholars, to understand the narrative form, digressions, philosophy of knowledge, and/or
history in Tristram Shandy, one must understand how the novel subverts the categorization and
systematization of Enlightenment thinking. The patterns of subversion in the text lend themselves to
arguments that characterize the novel as one of narrative play. This is understandable, but it ultimately does
not do justice to the complexity of the novel. To address this complexity, I turn to Friedrich Schiller, a German
poet and philosopher. I argue that the text enacts Schiller’s aesthetic framework by synthesizing the
competing impulses he describes in his aesthetic philosophy. Tristram Shandy does not seek the order and
systems of Locke and the Enlightenment, nor the overwhelming feeling of the Romantics’ sublimity; instead,
Tristram Shandy, setting a precedent for Schiller’s philosophy, seeks the most beautiful aesthetic goal, balance.
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Balance in Tristram Shandy: Laurence Sterne Through Schiller’s Eyes 
 Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy has been written about extensively because of the 
multiplicity of opinions and theories put forward by the text itself and the characters within the 
text.  Much of the scholarship about Tristram Shandy sets the text against the Enlightenment 
philosophies, especially those of John Locke, that were prominent influences on the thought of 
the period in which Sterne wrote the novel.  Some of the most foundation Enlightenment ideas 
about literature, knowledge, freedom, and time find opposition in Tristram Shandy.  The 
scholarship on Tristram Shandy covers a wide range of topics—reflecting the number of 
philosophical complications in Tristram Shandy—but in much of the criticism, the same chief 
concern can be found.  Whether the scholar is addressing narrative form and digressions or 
philosophy of knowledge or politics and history, the key to understanding the topic is 
understanding how the novel subverts the categorization and systematization that characterized 
much of the thought of the Enlightenment. 
 In “Complete Systems and Tristram Shandy,” Marcus Walsh argues that Tristram Shandy 
works to complicate the Enlightenment goal of categorizing and taxonomizing knowledge into 
neat systems of understanding.  Walsh uses Walter Shandy to exemplify this complication.  
According to Walsh, Walter’s mode of thinking counters the text of Tristram Shandy as a whole 
because of its encyclopedic nature.  Walsh states, “the proper business of a cyclopedia [is] to be 
complete” (18).  The encyclopedias that Walter loves are defined by their completeness.  The 
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entire purpose of their creation is to provide a complete reference point for any given topic, but, 
in practice, they often fail to provide Walter with the information he needs.  Walter would want 
Tristram Shandy to serve as a complete account of Tristram’s life, but the digressions in the text 
and Tristram’s penchant for aposiopesis deny the text any completeness.  Tristram Shandy’s anti-
systemic bent also applies to the politics of Sterne’s time. 
 In an essay on the politics of Tristram Shandy, John Havard states, “the multiple, 
competing frames of reference that Sterne goes out of his way to introduce into the untidily 
organized world of Tristram Shandy” serve as a rejection of the “presumption that the history of 
England through the ages (and subsequently world history) represents the inevitable triumph of 
progress and freedom, secured by the progress from constitutional government into 
parliamentary and eventually democratic rule” (Havard 587).  According to Havard, the tension 
between the past and the present that plays out in the interrupted narration of Tristram Shandy 
directly connects to the shifting political landscape of the mid-eighteenth century.  Havard argues 
that the text subverts the understanding of linear, progressive political freedom emerging in the 
mid-eighteenth century.  Tristram does not feel obligated to tell his stories in a linear, 
chronological way, and he often finds himself caught between past and present.  Tristram looks 
to the past for some force to anchor his story, but despite his clinging to the past, the present 
moment remains as uncertain as ever. 
 Many critics, in the face of reading Tristram Shandy as a rejection of systems of 
understanding, will describe the novel as one of play.  In “Genre and Tristram Shandy: The 
Novel of Quickness,” Toby Olshin focuses on the simultaneity of digression and progression in 
the novel to frame his argument that the text operates outside of time.  This position parallels the 
political understanding Havard argues for in relation to the structure of the narrative and its 
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digressions.  The simultaneity of digression and progression that Olshin describes is helpful for 
understanding the different, more complicated view of history and time provided in Tristram 
Shandy, described by Havard. 
 Most importantly in Olshin’s work, the nonlinear form of Tristram Shandy is seen as 
Sterne “playing with” time, which serves as a model for understanding the other subversive 
elements of the text.  The play of Sterne and Tristram gives the text its unconventional delivery, 
and this play is what ultimately makes Tristram Shandy a philosophical text as well as a literary 
text.  The novel very purposefully orients itself in opposition to Enlightenment ideals.  Although 
play is not a bad way to understand the operation of the text’s narrative, seeing the play as 
merely a subversion of systematic thought does not do justice to the complexity of the novel.  In 
order to illuminate the complexity of the text’s narrative form and philosophy, I turn to Friedrich 
Schiller, a German poet and philosopher, who also set himself against the ideals of 
Enlightenment thinking. 
 In response to the failure of the French Revolution and a growing fear of the isolating 
effects of Enlightenment ideals, Friedrich Schiller wrote On the Aesthetic Education of Man in 
1794.  On the Aesthetic Education of Man was written thirty years after Tristram Shandy, so 
Schiller’s ideas did not prefigure any of Sterne’s, but reading Tristram Shandy with Schiller in 
mind illuminates the text’s narrative form and the philosophical positions it takes.  Written in a 
series of letters, On the Aesthetic Education of Man responded directly to the work of German 
Enlightenment thinker Immanuel Kant and provided both an aesthetic and a political philosophy.  
Writing at the end of the Enlightenment, Schiller had a perspective that Sterne did not, but both 
were skeptical of the philosophical tendencies of the Enlightenment.  In On the Aesthetic 
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Education of Man, Schiller distinguishes between two distinct impulses that drive human 
behavior: formal and sensuous drives. 
 According to Schiller, the formal drive is the impulse to categorize and structure 
experience using one’s intellectual faculties.  The object of the formal drive is “shape, [...] a 
concept which includes all formal qualities of things and all their relations to the intellectual 
faculties” (Schiller 76).  Reason is the instrument of the formal drive, and when one orders, 
categorizes, and defines objects and experiences, one is enacting the formal drive.  The other side 
of the spectrum of human activity, for Schiller, is that of sensuous drives.  Sensuous drives are 
the impulses that arise from the pursuit of pleasure.  They drive the decisions that are made 
because of feeling.  The object of the sensuous drive is “life [...] which expresses all material 
being and all that is immediately present in the senses” (Schiller 76).  When one acts to procure 
sensual pleasure in the material world, one is enacting the sensuous drive.  The sensuous drive is 
at one end of the spectrum, and the formal drive is at the other. 
 It is helpful to understand the poles being described in more directly literary terms.  As I 
have said, the formal drive captures the modes of categorizing and taxonomizing thought that 
characterize Enlightenment philosophies.  These philosophies were coming to prominence in 
Sterne’s time, and he worked to problematize them as they emerged.  Schiller, at the end of the 
Enlightenment, was fed up with hyper-formal philosophies, but he was also hesitant about the 
philosophies that were emerging in response to the Enlightenment.  According to Schiller, 
philosophies that prioritized the sensuous drive as the governing principle also did not suffice.  
Many of the thinkers and artists writing during Schiller’s time jumped from the logic and reason 
of the Enlightenment directly into the passion and sublimity of Romanticism—and an 
overreliance on sensuousness.  Schiller, on the other hand, argues that the two drives must be 
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balanced.  Understanding the play in Tristram Shandy to be the balance of the formal and the 
sensuous drives illuminates both the philosophy and the art of the text. 
 This balancing act provides a new framework for understanding what Sterne 
accomplishes in Tristram Shandy.  The balancing of the formal and sensuous drives can be seen 
as a form of play—Schiller even calls it the “play drive,” but it is a distinct form of play, 
categorically different than the play characterized by other analyses of Tristram Shandy.  It is not 
that the text’s play merely subverts systematic thinking in order to condemn the formal drive 
altogether.  I argue that the text enacts Schiller’s aesthetic framework by synthesizing these 
competing impulses. 
 Starting at the very beginning of the text, Sterne gives us some ideas about how these 
competing impulses will be weaved together in the course of the novel.  The start of the novel is 
the story of Tristram’s conception, and one might expect a passionate story about the love of 
Tristram’s parents, but instead, Tristram’s mother interrupts Tristram’s conception to ask Walter 
about the winding of the clock on the wall (Sterne 2).  The issue of time in the novel is very 
important because of the novel’s nonlinear form, and during the moments of Tristram’s 
conception, his mother interrupts his father to ask if the clock is showing the right time.  Her 
concern about the clock and time, the most important structure that exists for creating order in 
experience, denies Tristram a natural conception and sets the course of his unfortunate life. 
 The clearest views of Tristram Shandy as a philosophical text come when the text steps 
away from the narrative and reflects on its strangeness and narrative form.  The text is aware that 
it is not merely telling a story, and Sterne even employs moments of clear self-reflection to 
illuminate the oddities and subversions within the text.  One of the best examples of this comes 
in “The Author’s Preface” of Volume Three, which fittingly appears after Chapter Twenty. 
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 The preface appears deep in Volume Three and opens a dialogue with John Locke 
directly.  In “The Author’s Preface,” Sterne is interacting quite plainly with the “formal drive” 
philosophy of Locke, which is at one end of Schiller’s spectrum.  The preface opens with a 
reference to Locke’s distinction between wit and judgment.  In a footnote, the editor describes 
Locke’s position on wit and judgment, which comes from Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding: Locke “considers judgment—the capacity to distinguish one thing from 
another—the useful function; wit—which notices similarities even where they are not obvious” 
(Anderson 140).  What is most important about this distinction for Locke is that “he considers 
[wit] at best amusing, at worst destructively misleading (a doctrine with dangerous implications 
for literature)” (Anderson 140).  Locke fears that literature that employs wit will undo the work 
that judgment does to categorize and order thoughts and experience.  The rationality of judgment 
is seen as the most important function for guiding human activity.  Schiller would see this 
position as over far too reliant on the formal drive, and the text agrees with him. 
 In the preface, Sterne sets up his account of wit and judgment by describing places with 
different amounts of wit and judgment.  The places represent what happens when wit and 
judgment are not properly balanced.  The picture that Sterne paints of a world where wit and 
judgment are unbalanced is not a pretty one.  “Within the narrow compass of his cave,” Sterne 
writes, “the spirits are compressed almost to nothing,—and where the passions of a man, with 
every thing which belongs to them, are as frigid as the zone itself” (142).  This place is frozen 
and barren, and the life of those inhabiting that world is equally desolate.  The alternative, where 
wit and judgment are balanced, is much nicer. 
 In this alternate universe, a place that is a “warmer and more luxuriant island [...] where 
humors run high,” the “glimmerings (as it were) of wit” are balanced “with a comfortable 
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provision of good plain household judgment” (Sterne 143).  If there was “more of either the one 
or the other, it would destroy the proper ballance betwixt them” and reduce the world to the 
barren, desolate condition described earlier (143).  Sterne stresses the importance of this balance 
even further: “The height of our wit and the depth of our judgment, you see, are exactly 
proportioned to the length and breadth of our necessities” (143).  The people’s needs are 
perfectly accounted for because the balance of wit and judgment is maintained. 
 Locke’s understanding of judgment connects directly to Schiller’s formulation of the 
formal drive.  In the passages laid out above, judgment is to be balanced with wit, so what is the 
connection between the wit that Locke and Sterne refer to and the spectrum that Schiller 
constructs in Aesthetic Education?  Unfortunately, it is not as simple as a calling the wit of Locke 
and Sterne the same thing as the sensuousness of Schiller.  When it comes to understanding wit 
as a countering idea to judgment, referring to the Oxford English Dictionary will be helpful.  The 
specific version of “wit” that opposes judgment is defined in the OED as the “quickness of 
intellect or liveliness of fancy” (“wit,” n.).  Wit is characterized by imagination and an ability to 
associate cleverly.  For Tristram, those clever associations are often the only way to tell stories of 
passion.  It is not that wit, for Tristram, is the same things as sensuousness, but wit, or 
imaginative association, allows for narrative digressions that make room for passion to enter the 
narrative.  This room would not be made if it were not for the power of wit.  This is clear in 
another moment from the preface in Volume Three. 
 Sterne sees the project of impassioned art to be one set against judgment’s pure dividing 
and categorizing: “What confusion!—what mistakes!—fiddlers and painters judging by their 
eyes and ears,—admirable!—trusting to the passions excited in an air sung, or a story painted to 
the heart,—instead of measuring them by a quadrant” (144).  These musicians and painters allow 
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for their senses, their passions, to pour into their stories as opposed to merely “measuring them 
by a quadrant.”  The artists’ ability to channel their senses through their art is seen as a form of 
confusion, but this confusion is a beautiful thing, according to Tristram.  When the artists are not 
“measuring [their stories] by a quadrant” and they employ wit to allow for feeling to enter their 
art, the balance of wit and judgment best serves its purpose.  Sterne does not believe the formal 
drive can sufficiently capture lived experience, and he wants wit to balance judgment by 
channeling sense experience into the foreground of expression. 
 A final moment at the end of the preface brings the philosophical import of the section 
home.  Sterne writes, 
I hate set dissertations,—and above all things in the world, ‘tis one of the silliest 
things in one of them, to darken your hypothesis by placing a number of tall, 
opake words, one before another, in a right line, betwixt your own and your 
reader’s conception,—when in all likelihood, if you had looked about, you might 
have seen something standing, or hanging up, which would have cleared the point 
at once. (Sterne 145) 
This passage foreshadows later sections that directly deal with the linearity of narrative, and, 
again, the message is clear.  Looking to the world and allowing information from the senses to 
affect how stories are told will enliven art, even if the cost is some of the linearity and 
completeness of traditional narrative.  There is a moment at the end of Volume Three that 
furthers this point. 
 In Chapter Forty-Two, after a long discussion of noses and the many writings on the 
subject, Tristram describes how he and his father appreciate Hafen Slawkenbergius, a preeminent 
writer on noses, for very different reasons.  Walter loves the work of Slawkenbergius because it 
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is “an institute of all that was necessary to be known of noses” (Sterne 175).  Tristram, on the 
other hand, thinks that the “best [...] most amusing part of Hafen Slawkenbergius is his tales” 
(Sterne 175).  Tristram recognizes that the tales might not be as useful as the encyclopedic parts 
of Slawkenbergius’s work, but this is the very reason he values the tales.  In Chapters Thirty-One 
through Forty-One, the narrative provides a complex mediation on the topic of noses.  There is 
even a chapter ventriloquizing Locke on the subject!  This portion of the text would please 
Walter and enacts the impulses of the formal drive.  Those chapters lead into the text’s 
distinction between Walter and Tristram when it comes to Slawkenbergius, and from there, in the 
beginning of Volume Four, Tristram writes an account of two of Slawkenbergius’s tales.  In the 
tales, Diego’s nose sends the city of Strasburg into a frenzy.  Tristram wants to take the time to 
show the passions of the people of Strasburg.  In Tristram’s delivery of the tales of 
Slawkenbergius, the text provides a moment of passion to balance what would have been an 
otherwise dry taxonomy of Slawkenbergius. 
 The marbled page in Volume Three also serves to balance the formal impulse with an 
experience of the senses (Sterne 165-166).  I would argue that the black page in Volume One 
serves a similar function (23-24).  These bizarre elements of Tristram Shandy are often seen as a 
way of poking fun at readers for seeking out and demanding meaning from every part of a text.  
They break the narrative away from its structure, and they provide a purely visual experience for 
readers.  This is a wildly unconventional move for a novel, and in these moments, the text 
requires readers to experience the narrative in an unusual way.  In fact, the novel invites readers 
to merely experience these parts of the narrative.  Readers might not accept this invitation, and 
they might overanalyze—a theme Sterne plays with throughout Tristram Shandy, but at least, 
these elements offer the possibility for a sensuous experience of the text.  Later on in the text, 
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after Volume Three, Sterne’s balancing act plays out over longer, more sweeping storylines.  A 
good example of this difference in the later sections of the text occurs in the arc of Volumes 
Seven and Eight. 
 In the first chapter of Volume Eight, Sterne delivers his famous cabbage planter scene.  
This chapter is the preface to Tristram’s telling of the story of the Widow Wadman’s pursuit of 
Toby, and it is one of the “metanarrative” moments in the text in which Tristram directly 
comments on his narration and his narrative choices.  Tristram references Toby’s amours at the 
end of Volume Six but spends all of Volume Seven describing his travels as he tries to escape 
Death.  He does not get around to telling the story of Toby’s amours until Volume Eight, which 
is why he feels the need to explain the digression of Volume Seven and the digressive form of 
the whole text. 
 Tristram recognizes that he is not telling his story in the traditional way.  In the first, 
short chapter of Volume Eight, Tristram boldly says, “I defy the best cabbage planter [...] to go 
on coolly, critically, and canonically, planting his cabbages one by one, in straight lines, and 
stoical distances, especially if slits in petticoats are unsew’d up” (Sterne 380).  Cabbage planters 
are narrators, and Tristram sets himself apart from the narrators who tell their stories “in straight 
lines.”  Tristram purposefully chooses to break from tradition by telling his story without rational 
sequence.  Tristram clearly is not convinced that the linear telling of a narrative successfully 
captures experience.  Telling the story in the traditional way would prohibit him from fully 
engaging with the parts of his story that have to do with “slits in petticoats.”  The “slits in 
petticoats” line from the passage quoted above refers to the end of Volume Seven, in which 
Tristram dances with Nannette, who has a torn skirt.  Although Nannette does not mind it, the slit 
in her petticoat is too much for Tristram.  Despite how flustered her torn skirt makes him, he 
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envisions spending the rest of his life dancing the night away with Nannette.  This part of the 
narrative, like Slawkenbergius’s tales, would go untold if Tristram abided by the traditional laws 
of narration, those governed by an overreliance on the formal drive, which send the text, at all 
costs, toward completion. 
 Throughout the novel, Tristram promises to tell certain stories, but he almost never 
immediately follows through on those promises.  The amours of Toby and Mrs. Wadman 
exemplify this form of delayed follow-through.  The text does not have one predetermined story 
to deliver, and Tristram’s willingness to break from the direction of the narrative to deliver a 
digression that concludes with a story of passion shows that the organizing structures of the 
novel—the stories that the narrator promises to deliver—can and should be interrupted by the 
narrator’s passions. 
 Tristram believes that by “straddling out, or sidling into some bastardly digression,” his 
narrative style more successfully tells the story.  Tristram recognizes that his narrative 
digressions reject traditions of storytelling—he calls them “bastardly,” after all, but he is 
convinced that his mode of telling does more justice to what he has experienced.  He succeeds 
where conventional narrators fail because he engages with the passions that exist alongside the 
other stories unfolding around him, the stories that he plans to tell. 
 Traditional narration, the planting of cabbages in straight lines, might have more 
efficiently told the narrative of Toby and Wadman, but the assumption of narrative success as 
directly proportional to narrative efficiency is the understanding of narrative that Tristram 
Shandy rejects.  It might be easier to consume the story packaged in the traditional narrative 
form, but what is lost is the passion that we get from the digressive form Tristram employs.  In 
this moment, Tristram chooses passion over linear narrative structure, and he is adamant that his 
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methods are superior.  What is complicated about this section is that, despite Tristram’s feelings 
about the superiority of the narrative form he employs, the section that follows the cabbage 
planter scene is a relatively linear one.  Tristram finally gets around to telling the story of Toby 
and Wadman’s relationship, which balances the passion of the connection between Tristram and 
Nannette. 
 In the telling of the amours of Toby and Wadman, Tristram portrays their connection by 
using the language of a military campaign.  The systems of tactical war become the mode of 
narration, and Toby and Wadman pursue each other like enemies on a battlefield.  The 
description of the amours of Toby and Wadman is such a stark contrast from the description of 
Tristram’s connection with Nannette in Volume Seven.  According to the narration, Toby and 
Wadman engage in a battle, while Tristram and Nannette dance.  The former is portrayed as a 
connection of planning and strategy, while the latter is a connection of passion and organicity.  
But neither of the connections is successful.  A gross misunderstanding between Toby and 
Wadman ends their connection, and Tristram floats away from Nannette and returns to his 
travels.  By showing these connections, the text moves between formal impulses and sensuous 
impulses respectively, but the text does not affirm one or the other by granting one completion 
and leaving the other unfinished.  Instead, the text delivers both of the narratives, in their 
opposing modes, separately but to the same ends.  There is even a digression implanted into the 
amours of Toby and Wadman that furthers this point. 
 In the midst of the militaristic romance of Toby and Wadman, Corporal Trim tells the 
story of the time he fell in love with the Beguine nun who tended to him after he injured his knee 
in battle.  In this moment, Tristram allows for this digression told by Trim to interfere with the 
completion of Toby and Wadman’s narrative.  Over Chapters Twenty through Twenty-Two, 
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Trim describes how he fell more in love with the nun the longer she tended to his injury.  Her 
touch was overwhelmingly pleasurable to Trim, and just as his story is building to a sexual 
climax, Toby interrupts him, and Tristram returns to telling the amours of Toby and Wadman.  
This digression, and its failure to reach completion, is a microcosm of the form of Tristram 
Shandy.  In this narrative movement, like the movement between Tristram and Nannette and 
Toby and Wadman, the text chooses to provide both formality and sensuousness in balance.  
 There are the stories that Tristram says he is going to tell, and although he does tell a 
number of those stories, he also makes room the digressions like the ones fleshed out in the 
sections above.  If he were operating conventionally, those digressions would be left out to 
efficiently tell a narrative to completion.  Tristram Shandy is an account of Tristram’s life; it is 
his autobiography, but it is nearly impossible to pick out a dominant narrative thread.  Much of 
the assessment of Tristram Shandy surrounds the text’s digressions, and Tristram is clear when 
he is embarking on a digression, but there is not one narrative thread from which these 
digressions pull away.  Olshin is right to point out how the text both digresses and progresses, 
but the framework that Schiller’s aesthetics provides gives an account of why Sterne employs the 
specific narrative structure of Tristram Shandy.  An expressive mode ruled by judgment is the 
norm—and Sterne does not do away with that mode entirely, but without the speed and 
imagination of associative wit, the text would not have the passion that enlivens it and makes it 
amusing.  The text has a finite number of pages, but ultimately, no true completion is reached. 
 In the Twenty-sixth Letter of Aesthetic Education, Schiller describes how the formal and 
sensuous drives carry over into communication and human connection.  When one searches for 
humanity and connection only in the world of self-reflection and thought, no common ground 
between people can be created.  On the other hand, when one searches for humanity and 
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connection only in the outside world of materiality and sense, one misses out on the important 
order that introspection gives experience (Schiller 124-131).  For Schiller, this balance is also a 
balance of communication.  Only trying to communicate inwardly is an overreliance on the 
formal drive, and only trying to communicate outwardly is an overreliance on the sensuous drive.  
For Schiller, our ability to commune with ourselves and with others grants us our freedom by 
giving us a true inter-subjectivity.  Schiller’s aesthetic utopia is a universe where we make art 
that balances our communication with ourselves and with each other.  It allows for a sphere of 
intersection where we honor both our own necessities and the necessities of those around us, as 
Tristram might put it.  Tristram Shandy does not seek the order and systems of Locke and the 
Enlightenment, nor the overwhelming feeling of the Romantics’ sublimity; instead, Tristram 
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